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29 February 1964

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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## DAILY BRIEF

Cyprus: Incidents are occurring more frequently, with both Greek and Turkish Cypriots continuing to maneuver for tactical positions on the island.

[Two Greek Cypriot arms caches and a Greek Cypriot observation post have been identified near Kyrenia. The US army attaché notes that this is a logical step toward cutting off any Turkish reinforcements for the Turkish Army contingent near Nicosia.]

[In addition, if the Greek Cypriots can sufficiently strengthen their positions in this area to deny the Turkish Cypriots access to supply points along the north coast, they can apply an economic stranglehold and render the Turkish Cypriot position in the interior precarious.]

The Greek Cypriot press has increased the tempo of its anti-British campaign while its anti-Americanism is becoming less vitriolic. In Greece, however, there has been widespread denunciation of US action supporting the right of a Turkish Cypriot leader to speak before the UN Security Council.

Acting Cypriot Foreign Minister Araouzos has stated that his government no longer is prepared to negotiate the constitutional issue on the basis of President Makarios' 30 November proposals. These

would have retained the basic structure of the 1959 settlement while revising the constitution in such a way as to reduce the political power of Turkish Cypriots.

The Greek Cypriots now demand that an entirely new constitution be drawn up minus the right of outside intervention. The constitution would provide for a unified state with majority rule and constitutional guarantees of minority rights.

British attempts to stimulate a meeting between the Greek and Turkish prime ministers appear to have collapsed. Greek Prime Minister Papandreu is unlikely to participate unless there is prior agreement on the necessity to modify the 1959 settlement. In Ankara, Foreign Minister Erkin has said his government would welcome a meeting of the three guarantor powers or two meetings--one British and Greek, one British and Turkish.

Araouzos appeared embarrassed when asked by the US chargé in Nicosia if the Cypriot-Soviet air agreement granted Cyprus reciprocal rights. He described it as "just an ordinary" civil air agreement.

[\*Erkin yesterday told the US ambassador that he hoped Washington would approve unilateral Turkish military intervention, should it become necessary. He repeated previous assurances that no move would be made without prior consultation with the US, but warned that events were moving rapidly and quick decisions might have to be made. It is possible that consultation regarding an impending move might be initiated virtually simultaneously with such action.]

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There has been no official confirmation of the Turkish military exercises that press reports state took place on 27 February.

South Vietnam: The Viet Cong appear to be continuing their terrorist campaign against Americans.

Communist agents reportedly are distributing leaflets in Saigon which call for a sabotage campaign to celebrate the 3 March anniversary of the North Vietnamese Workers (Communist) Party. In addition, the Viet Cong have renewed a reward offer of \$250 for each American killed.

On 26 February a bomb exploded against a US military advisory compound in the delta, the first terrorist action against Americans since the bombing of a theater in Saigon on 16 February.

Some South Vietnamese military forces have been moved into Saigon to assist police in maintaining general security. A joint US-Vietnamese security committee has put in effect a number of measures to provide greater protection, but General Khanh told Ambassador Lodge the Viet Cong would probably try to "outflank" these measures and that he expected more trouble in early March.

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\*Libya: Premier Muntassir states that the pressure of public opinion may force the early evacuation of the American and British bases in Libya.

In a conversation with the US ambassador on 25 February, Muntassir said that the recent government statement that it would not renew the base agreements--which expire in 1971 and 1973 respectively--had been designed to placate popular outcries and blunt Egyptian propaganda on the issue.

Muntassir, a conservative pro-Western politician who negotiated the agreements in the 1950s, added, however, that he personally believed his government would be unable to resist public pressure against the bases until the agreements expire.

Muntassir said that he could not count on the full support of the police, the army, or the Cyrenaican tribes--traditionally a loyal element--if he were to insist that the bases remain in Libya. He suggested joint Libyan-US-UK contingency planning for early termination of the agreements if the pressure on the issue became too great for him to resist.

Muntassir indicated that he had not discussed this matter with the King, who has always considered the Anglo-American presence in Libya essential for the preservation of the monarchy.

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East Germany - West Berlin: East Germany is attempting to revive the suspended Berlin pass negotiations, but has not yet offered any concessions.

The East Germans have insisted that GDR personnel be stationed in West Berlin to issue passes. At the 27 February session, the West Berlin negotiator announced that the talks would be suspended until mid-April unless the East Germans changed their position.

Shortly after the meeting, the East German news agency, apparently in a move to put the onus for any breakdown in the talks on Bonn and the West Berlin Senat, stated that the GDR was prepared to resume the talks at any time. The statement added that "if the Senat should change its mind," agreement possibly could still be reached in time to arrange Easter visits for West Berliners with relatives in East Berlin.

Simultaneously the East German negotiator pressed the Senat to accept an interim arrangement--still keyed to East German personnel functioning in West Berlin--whereby West Berliners would be able to visit the Soviet sector at any time on "urgent family matters." He intimated that East German officials might work out of sight in West Berlin and have no direct contact with the public.

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Belgium-Congo: Relations between the two countries appear to be improving.

A Belgian emissary just returned from Leopoldville claims that Premier Adoula is agreeable to settling the Congo's debt to Belgium in accordance with a formula proposed by Foreign Minister Spaak.

Under this formula, the Congo will pay \$6 million annually toward servicing the debt incurred by the former colonial government. In return, Belgium will turn over to the Congolese certain assets--shares in various companies--that were previously held by the Belgian colonial government.

Spaak is planning to visit Leopoldville in mid-March and he hopes to conclude the arrangement then. Settlement of this issue might lead to some progress in the Belgian military training program.

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NOTES

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Venezuela: President Betancourt told the British ambassador on 26 February that if the Shell Oil Company should sell any oil to Cuba, it could lead to expropriation of its Venezuelan holdings at a fair price. He also spoke to the French and Spanish ambassadors individually on the same day, indicating his displeasure at their countries' dealings with Cuba, and suggested that Venezuelan workers may refuse to service aircraft and ships from their countries.

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